In 1779 Gerard, the French minister, devised a plan which contemplated a joint expedition of the French and American fleets against the British colonies to the northward. Gerard’s purpose was “to give the King of France Halifax and Newfoundland.” In May, 1779, he consulted with Washington in his camp about the proposed expedition. By September Gerard’s plan, or a similar one, had so far matured that the Marine Committee ordered the Navy Board at Boston to prepare the Continental vessels for a three months’ cruise and to hold them ready to sail at a moment’s warning to join the French fleet, or to proceed to such other place as Washington or Count D’Estaing might direct. The Board was to provide a sufficient number of pilots for Newfoundland, Halifax, Rhode Island, and the Penobscot river. This expedition was not abandoned until November, 1779.[209] The Committee struck at the enemy’s lines of communication between his army and navy in America, and the British Isles, Canada, the Bermudas, Florida, and the West Indies. After the transfer of the war to the Southern states in 1778 and 1779, transports running between New York and Savannah and Charleston were vulnerable craft. The capture of British transports laden with munitions of war, provisions, and troops had the advantage of obtaining for the Americans the very sinews of war, of which the enemy were deprived. When troops were captured, they could be exchanged for an equal number of American prisoners. The reader may recall that it was for the purpose of intercepting British transports that Congress fitted out the first Continental vessels in October, 1775.