D. _By Statute of Limitation._ In Tennessee, three years of adverse possession invested the title of a slave in the possessor by virtue of the statute of limitation.[159] By the statute of limitation, a gift of parol, which is absolutely void, would, after the lapse of three years’ possession, convey title.[160] Judge Green in Davis v. Mitchell, held that an infant might hold adverse possession of a slave, either by himself or through a guardian, and that three years of such possession invested the title of the slave in him.[161] Three years of uninterrupted possession not only invested title, but the right to convey that title.[162] E. _By Statute of Frauds and Fraudulent Conveyances._ All gifts, grants, loans, alienations or conveyances made with fraudulent purposes were valid only between the parties making them and their heirs, assigns, and administrators, and in no way barred the action of creditors.[163] A conveyance of goods or chattels, without a valuable consideration, was considered fraudulent, unless it was made by a will duly proved and recorded or a deed acknowledged and proved. By act of 1805, such recording had to be done within nine months to be valid against creditors or future purchasers.[164] In Tennessee the want of possession was only prima facie evidence of fraud, and might be explained.[165] If a father represented a slave to be his son’s delivered possession and permitted possession to continue during the lifetime of the son, who also claimed the slave as his own, it was a gift. The acknowledgment of the son that the slave belonged to the father would not bar the claim of the widow.[166] F. _By Prescription._ Prescription passed the title and possession of slaves in Tennessee.[167] In the case of Andrews v. Hartsfield, Judge Green held that a bona fide loan of slaves by a father to a married daughter for five years subjected the slaves to sale for the debts of her husband.[168] VII. THE LAW OF INCREASE— A. _As to Condition of Increase._ Tennessee adopted the rule of nature, pertaining to human creatures, in declaring that the condition of the mother should be that of the child. Children born of a mother emancipated at a future date received their freedom with the mother. In the case of Harris v. Clarissa, who was to receive her freedom at the age of twenty, Judge Catron, speaking of the condition of her children born after the bequest of her freedom, said: “Had she been a slave forever, their condition would have been the same, she being a slave for years, their condition could not be worse. The child before born is a part of the mother, and its condition the same; birth does not alter its rights.”[169] Children born of a mother conditionally manumitted were held to be slaves.[170]