The neutral merchant: in relation to the law of contraband of war and blockade under the order in Council of 11th March, 1915 — John Shaqi
The neutral merchant: in relation to the law of contraband of war and blockade under the order in Council of 11th March, 1915Piggott, Francis Taylor
History
The neutral merchant: in relation to the law of contraband of war and blockade under the order in Council of 11th March, 1915
Piggott, Francis Taylor
Blockade; Contraband of war; Neutrality; World War, 1914-1918
Reduced, therefore, to its simplest expression, the position taken
up by the United States is this: Our trade is of greater importance
than your victory. Admitting the hypothesis to the full that a neutral
country has no interest in the result of a war, is unconcerned which
side wins, yet I do not believe that this attitude finds any warrant
in the principles on which international law is based. But there is
another and very practical reason in favour of my second contention.
Too strenuous a protest is apt to make men look a little below the
surface of mere words, to turn their attention curiously to trade
statistics. They have been dexterously handled in the British answers.
A neutral Government is not the best judge of its merchants’ claims;
inevitably it becomes their advocate, and in the tangle of discussion
is apt to identify itself with commercial transactions which, it is
common knowledge, often need the closest investigation. The true
position of a neutral Government, the almost complete severance from
its protection of merchants who deal, however indirectly, with a
belligerent, demands, I venture with great deference to assert, an
altogether different attitude from that taken by the United States
Government.
International law has of late been the subject of much loose talk, by
the German especially; and some colour has been lent to his assertions
by the nature of the American Protests to Great Britain. International
law does not profess to govern the conduct of belligerents between
themselves, but only the laws of war. Except in so far as these have
been incorporated in conventions, except in so far as the principles of
humanity have been reduced into concrete words and so have become laws
binding the consenting nations when they fight, it is not the province
of international law to mitigate the blows of war.[2] A neutral
Government is not concerned with the methods of warfare adopted by a
belligerent until they ape the barbarian. Then, even in the absence
of convention, it is entitled to protest in the name of our common
humanity. Conventions to which both belligerents and the neutral are
parties entitle it to support its protest by diplomatic action. But,
convention or no convention, more strenuous action is justified by the
application of elementary legal principles when its citizens, pursuing
their normal avocations, are injured.[3] International law, properly
understood, governs the relations of belligerents with neutrals.
Its sanctions are not belligerent action, nor any action against
the alleged offender, which may even indirectly benefit the enemy.
Arbitration after the War, and compensation, are the only remedies
when neutral property has been injured. Then, and only then, can the
principles of international law be calmly discussed; then, and only
then, can any new departure by a belligerent be tested by a reference
to fundamental principles. The reason is obvious. International law is
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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