The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also at least of the substance thereof. While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion for a moment. The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left to it." The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed "to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned," and he added that Germany strongly desired "that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure." This is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"? [German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]