Immediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunely taken himself to Ischl, where he remained until after the expiration of the time limit. Access to him proved difficult, and the Russian Charge at Vienna, having lodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in order to take no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl. Nevertheless, Berchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital was Germany's excuse for its failure to get the time limit extended. If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace. Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word. Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on the morning of July 25 offered "to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy." [English "White Paper," No. 17.] As Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the fate of Servia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or magnanimous? On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including Germany) should unite "in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate." [English "White Paper," Nos. 24 and 25.] To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied: "First and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized _by the abstention of all the powers from intervention in it_," but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose, "co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between Russia and Austria." [German "White Paper," Annex 13.] This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference with Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia. Germany would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition mediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable. How she "co-operated" we shall presently see. All that Germany _did_ on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally's request for more time if it had ever been made?