On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given. [English "White Paper," No. 85.] Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador, and expressed regret "that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion." [English "White Paper," No. 75.] On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian "Orange Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German Government "_to suggest any form of procedure_ under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, _could be applied_." To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like pressure it might "_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and present a fait accompli_." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 29--English "White Paper," No. 70.] This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war, as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and expected from the first. As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.