We know from the German "White Paper"--even if we did not conclude as a matter of irresistible inference--that many important communications passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable that some communications must also have passed between those two countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies had commenced an _aggressive_ war, which released her from any obligation under the Triple Alliance. The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna. Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations," "we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the _utmost_ and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy." [German "White Paper."] This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving other diplomatic documents had only added the _text_ of the advice which it thus gave Vienna. The same significant omission will be found when the same official defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria "to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again _the text_ is not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given to the world. The communications, which passed between that office and its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given _in extenso_, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German official defense it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna and only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin. This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them. Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts. Austria's Case Against Servia.