The cause for such gloomy utterances may be found in those superficial indications of chaos such as the breakdown of exchange and of international trade; the severe business depression; the waste and inefficiency of industry; the prevalence of unrest and sabotage, and the preparations for future wars. Traditionally, the old institutions still exist and are cherished by those who believe that they will be rehabilitated and re-established. But as the months succeed one another and lengthen into years, without any evidence that "things will right themselves as soon as the war is over," it becomes increasingly apparent, even to the conservative that the situation is far from what they had promised themselves it would be. Europe's day-to-day experience between 1919 and 1922 has convinced millions that some disaster impends. For the most part, however, they fail to realize that the "disaster" is already upon them. The disorganization of the world's financial structure, following on the drains of the war and the debauches and exactions of the peace, has been the object of much comment, with the emphasis laid on the aspects rather than on the essential characteristics of the breakdown. One of the basic assumptions of the present economic order is that promises to pay must be redeemed at par. Failing in this redemption, the promisor is declared bankrupt, and beyond the pale of reputable business society. During the past eight years, most of the leading countries of Europe have become bankrupt. Before the World War, the sixteen principal belligerents had total debts of 28,660 millions of dollars, with a total note circulation of 5,000 millions, making a total of promises to pay amounting to something more than 33 billions of dollars. When the Treaty of Paris was signed, these sixteen countries reported debts of 171,633 millions of dollars and paper money issues of 77,954 millions, making a total of promises to pay about eight times the volume of 1913. Since the signing of the Treaty, most of the European countries, belligerents and neutrals alike, have continued to pile up obligations. According to the estimates of O.P. Austin, of the National City Bank of New York, world indebtedness was 43 billions of dollars in 1913, 205 billions in 1918 and 400 billions in 1921. ("Our Eleven Billions," R. Mountsier. Seltzer. 1922. p. 43.) A point has now been reached where the French, Russian, Italian, German, Austrian and Hungarian debts are equal to at least half of the total estimated national wealth. When it is remembered that most of this wealth is in private hands, and heavily encumbered with private mortgages; that the cities have issued enormous numbers of bonds against the same wealth, and that even though the wealth were in public hands it could not be liquidated for anything like its estimated value, it must be apparent that the capitalist world--particularly that part lying in Central Europe--has put itself into a position where its governments