The Nineteenth and Their Times: Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They ServedBiddulph, J. (John)
History
The Nineteenth and Their Times: Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They Served
Biddulph, J. (John)
Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 19th Light Dragoons, 1786-1821; Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 19th Regiment, 1759-1763; Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 19th Regiment, 1779-1783; Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 23rd Light Dragoons, 1781-1786; Great Britain. Army. Royal Hussars, 19th (Queen Alexandra's Own)
This naturally caused some ill
feeling between the King’s and Company’s officers. The arrangement
had first been made when there was only a single battalion of King’s
troops in India. As the number of King’s troops increased, the extra
rank given to the officers became a very serious grievance to the
Company’s officers, which was further aggravated by the Company’s
policy of maintaining a very small number of field officers, and
of having their regiments commanded by Captains. The instructions
for avoiding disputes with the Company’s officers, that were issued
to Sir John Burgoyne, before sailing from England, had been a
stereotyped formula of orders for all officers sent with troops to
India for more than twenty years past: but such admonitions were of
little use under conditions that made friction inevitable.
The Madras Government was possessed at that time of a perverse
spirit, that led them into all kinds of extravagancies and never
ending quarrels. The Members of the Council fought amongst
themselves; they evaded or disobeyed the orders of the Court of
Directors, and ignored the authority of the Governor General.
Individually, they commanded little respect. Collectively, they
mismanaged everything. They interfered in military matters, that in
a time of war were peculiarly in the province of the chief military
authority; and they frittered away the forces at their disposal in
ill-conceived and badly equipped expeditions that frequently ended
in disaster. Finally, they quarrelled with everybody who was not
immediately under their orders, and wrote long winded complaints to
the Court of Directors and to Bengal, instead of doing their best
under the trying circumstances of the time. The King’s officers on
their side were also difficult to deal with. They asserted their
right to direct how and where the King’s troops should be employed,
and, in other respects, claimed an independence of the Civil
Government incompatible with public interests. In 1780, when the
Commander in Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, had been sent down from Bengal,
after the disaster to Colonel Baillie’s army, he was furnished with
orders for the suspension of the acting Governor, Mr Whitehill,
against whom the gravest charges had been made, and he was specially
invested with powers that to a great extent made him independent
of the Madras Council, including the exclusive direction of the
treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war. The temporary
grant of such powers was necessary under existing circumstances, but
was none the less resented by the Madras Council; though there was
little active opposition till the assumption of the Governorship by
Lord Macartney in June 1781. The Council complained that more was
not accomplished, Sir Eyre Coote complained that his troops were
sent into the field without supplies; the Council sent an expedition
against the Dutch settlements, without consulting the General, and an
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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