Although the author’s point of view, as the title indicates, is throughout strictly psychological, he has given his attention also to social relations and “conditions of collective adaptation,” which he regards as prefigured, anticipated, and sanctified by religious rites and myths. This, we think, implies some confusion between religion and morality. Morality deals with collective human life, but religion deals with collective life generally, and undertakes at the same time to provide a physical and a metaphysical explanation of things. We shall see that in the beginning religion was a superstitious physics, in which the forces of nature were regarded simply as the expression of some unknown person or person’s volitions, and that it thus naturally assumed a sociological form. * * * * * III. It is important that there should be no misunderstanding in regard to this _non-religion_ of the future, as contradistinguished from the multitude of _religions of the future_ that have been recently expounded. It has seemed to us that these various expositions are based on a number of equivocations. In the first place religion, properly so-called, has sometimes been confused with metaphysics, sometimes with morals, sometimes with both; and it is owing to this confusion that religion has been conceived to be indestructible. Is it not by an abuse of language that Mr. Spencer, for example, gives the name of religion to speculations concerning the unknowable and thence readily deduces the conclusion that religion, by which he means metaphysics, possesses an impregnable stronghold in the human mind? In the same way many other contemporary philosophers, like Herr von Hartmann, the theologian of the unconscious, have not resisted the temptation of describing for us a religion of the future, which resolves itself simply into their own system, whatever it may be, of philosophy. Others again, especially among liberal Protestants, preserve the name of religion for purely rationalistic systems of thought. There is, of course, a sense in which one may admit that metaphysics and morals constitute a religion, or form at least the vanishing point toward which religion tends. But, in many books, the “religion of the future” is no more than a somewhat hypocritical compromise with some form of positive religion. Under cover of the symbolism dear to the Germans, they save in appearance what they in reality destroy. It is in opposition to this species of subterfuge that we have adopted the less misleading term of the “Non-religion of the Future.” Thus we separate ourselves from Von Hartmann and the other prophets who reveal to us, point by point, the religion of the fiftieth century. When one approaches an object of such ardent controversy it is better to employ words with exactness. Everything, first and last, has been included within the