The organisation of thought, educational and scientificWhitehead, Alfred North
Philosophy
The organisation of thought, educational and scientific
Whitehead, Alfred North
Education
I pass lightly over that understanding which should be given by the
literary side of education. It is not peculiarly the function of this
Association to consider it. Nor do I wish to be supposed to pronounce
on the relative merits of a classical or a modern curriculum. I would
only remark that the understanding which we want is an understanding
of an insistent present. The only use of a knowledge of the past
is to equip us for the present. No more deadly harm can be done to
young minds than by depreciation of the present. The present contains
all that there is. It is holy ground; for it is the past, and it is
the future. At the same time it must be observed that an age is no
less past if it existed two hundred years ago than if it existed two
thousand years ago. Do not be deceived by the pedantry of dates. The
ages of Shakespeare and of Molière are no less past than are the ages
of Sophocles and of Virgil. The communion of saints is a great and
inspiring assemblage, but it has only one possible hall of meeting,
and that is, the present; and the mere lapse of time through which any
particular group of saints must travel to reach that meeting-place,
makes very little difference.
Passing now to the scientific and logical side of education, we
remember that here also ideas which are not utilised are positively
harmful. By utilising an idea, I mean relating it to that stream,
compounded of sense perceptions, feelings, hopes, desires, and of
mental activities relating thought to thought, which forms our life.
I can imagine a set of beings which might fortify their souls by
passively reviewing disconnected ideas. Humanity is not built that
way--except perhaps some editors of newspapers.
In scientific training, the first thing to do with an idea is to prove
it. But allow me for one moment to extend the meaning of "prove"; I
mean--to prove its worth. Now an idea is not worth much unless the
propositions in which it is embodied are true. Accordingly an essential
part of the proof of an idea is the proof, either by experiment or by
logic, of the truth of the propositions. But it is not essential that
this proof of the truth should constitute the first introduction to
the idea. After all, its assertion by the authority of respectable
teachers is sufficient evidence to begin with. In our first contact
with a set of propositions, we commence by appreciating their
importance. That is what we all do in after-life. We do not attempt,
in the strict sense, to prove or to disprove anything, unless its
importance makes it worthy of that honour. These two processes of
proof, in the narrow sense, and of appreciation do not require a rigid
separation in time. Both can be proceeded with nearly concurrently. But
in so far as either process must have the priority, it should be that
of appreciation by use.
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