[Footnote 54: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _Alaska_, p. 398.] [Footnote 55: Theophilus Hahn remarks (_The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi_, p. 40) that Kolben's reports have been doubted by European writers without any good reason.] [Footnote 56: Kolben, _Present State of the Cape of Good Hope_, i. 301. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 339.] [Footnote 57: Quoted by Tyler, _Forty Years among the Zulus_, p. 197.] [Footnote 58: Zöller, _Kamerun_, ii. 92. _Cf._ _Idem_, _Das Togoland_, p. 37.] [Footnote 59: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 34. _Cf._ Foreman, _Philippine Islands_, p. 185.] [Footnote 60: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 106.] [Footnote 61: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 224 _sqq._] Much less conspicuous than the emotion of public resentment is the emotion of public approval. These public emotions are largely of a sympathetic character, and, whilst a tendency to sympathetic resentment is always involved in the sentiment of social affection, a tendency to sympathetic retributive kindly emotion is not. Among the lower animals this latter emotion seems hardly to occur at all, and in men it is often deplorably defective. Resentment towards an enemy is itself, as a rule, a much stronger emotion than retributive kindly emotion towards a friend. And, as for the sympathetic forms of these emotions, it is not surprising that the altruistic sentiment is more readily moved by the sight of pain than by the sight of pleasure,[62] considering that its fundamental object is to be a means of protection for the species. Moreover, sympathetic retributive kindliness has powerful rivals in the feelings of jealousy and envy, which tend to make the individual hostile both towards him who is the object of a benefit and towards him who bestows it. As an ancient writer observes, "many suffer with their friends when the friends are in distress, but are envious of them when they prosper."[63] But though these circumstances are a hindrance to the rise of retributive kindly emotions of a sympathetic kind, they do not prevent public approval in a case when the whole society profits by a benefit, nor have they any bearing on those disinterested instinctive likings of which I have spoken above. I think, then, we may {130} safely conclude that public praise and moral approval occurred, to some degree, even in the infancy of human society. It will appear from numerous facts recorded in following chapters, that the moral consciousness of modern savages contains not only condemnation, but praise. [Footnote 62: _Cf._ Jodl, _Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, p. 686.] [Footnote 63: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 259.] CHAPTER VI ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS