A law expresses a rule of duty by making an act or omission which is regarded as wrong a crime, that is, by forbidding it under pain of punishment. Law does not in all cases directly threaten[38] with punishment--I say directly, since all law is coercive, and all coercion at some stage involves the possibility of punishment.[39] Sanctions, or the consequences by which the sovereign political authority threatens to enforce the laws set by it, may {169} have in view either the indemnification of the injured party, or the suffering of the injurer. In the latter case the sanctions are called punishments. But, though highly important, the distinction between indemnification and punishment is not absolute. A person who causes harm to another would hardly have to pay damages unless some kind of guilt or quasi-guilt were imputed to him; and, on the other hand, punishment may actually consist in the damages he has to pay. Moreover, the suffering involved in punishment must be regarded as a kind of indemnification in so far as it is intended to gratify the injured party's craving for revenge. The pleasure of vengeance, says Bentham, "is a gain; it calls to mind Samson's riddle--it is sweet coming out of the terrible, it is honey dropping from the lion's mouth."[40] In cases where the injured party is allowed to decide whether the injurer shall be punished or not, or what punishment (within certain limits) shall be inflicted upon him, it is obvious that punishment is largely looked upon as a means of indemnification. However, the fact that such a privilege is granted to the injured party indicates the existence of some degree of sympathetic resentment in the public. Punishment, in all its forms, is essentially an expression of indignation in the society which inflicts it.[41] Hence it is of extreme importance for the study of moral ideas, and calls for our careful consideration. [Footnote 38: "Not every sovereign can make sure of enforcing his commands; and sometimes laws are made without even any great intention of enforcing them" (Pollock, _Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics_, p. 9 _sq._).] [Footnote 39: _Cf._ Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 2.] [Footnote 40: Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 309.] [Footnote 41: "Die Missbilligung ist das Wesentliche aller Strafe" (von Bar, _Die Grundlagen des Strafrechts_, p. 4). "La peine consiste dans une réaction passionnelle d'intensité graduée" (Durkheim, _Division du travail social_, p. 96).]