According to Hebrew notions, it is man's duty to avenge offences against God; every crime involves a breach of God's law, and is punishable as such, and hardly any punishment is too severe to be inflicted on the ungodly.[206] These ideas were adopted by the Christian Church and by Christian governments.[207] The principle {198} stated in the Laws of Cnut, that "it belongs very rightly to a Christian king that he avenge God's anger very deeply, according as the deed may be,"[208] was acted upon till quite modern times, and largely contributed to the increasing severity of the penal codes. It was therefore one of the most important steps towards a more humane legislation when, in the eighteenth century, this principle was superseded by the contrary doctrine, "Il faut faire honorer la Divinité, et ne la venger jamais."[209] [Footnote 206: _Cf._ Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 162 _sq._] [Footnote 207: von Eicken, _Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung_, p. 563 _sqq._ Abegg, _op. cit._ p. 111 _sq._ Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 530 _sq._ Günther, _op. cit._ ii. 12 _sqq._ Henke, _op. cit._ ii. 310 _sq._ Brunner, _op. cit._ ii. 587.] [Footnote 208: _Laws of Cnut_, ii. 40.] [Footnote 209: Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des lois_, xii. 4 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 282).] From the fact, then, that crimes are punished not only as wrongs against individuals, but as wrongs against the State, and, especially, as wrongs against some despotic or semi-divine lawgiver, or against the Deity, it follows that even seemingly excessive punishments may, to a large extent, be regarded as manifestations of public resentment. This emotion does not necessarily demand like for like. The law of talion presupposes equality of rights; it is not applicable to impersonal offences, nor to offences against kings or gods. And as the demands of public resentment may exceed the _lex talionis_, so they may on the other hand fall short of it. Moreover, though the degree of punishment on the whole more or less faithfully represents the degree of indignation aroused by any particular crime in comparison with other crimes belonging to the same penal system, we must not take the comparative severity of the criminal laws of different peoples as a safe index to the intensity of their reprobation of crime. As we have seen before, the strength of moral indignation cannot be absolutely measured by the desire to cause pain to the offender. When the emotion of resentment is sufficiently refined, the infliction of suffering is regarded as a means rather than as an end.