However, as is frequently the case with general terms, these concepts are mentioned without any distinct idea of their contents. The relation in which many of them stand to the moral emotions is complicated; the use of them is often vague; and ethical theorisers, instead of subjecting them to a careful analysis, have done their best to increase the confusion by adapting the meaning of the terms to fit their theories. Very commonly, in the definition of the goodness or badness of acts, reference is made, not to their tendencies to evoke emotions of approval or indignation, but to the causes of these tendencies, that is, to those qualities in the acts which call forth moral emotions. Thus, because good acts generally produce pleasure and bad acts pain, goodness and badness have been identified with the tendencies of acts to produce pleasure or pain. The following statement of Sir James Stephen is a clearly expressed instance of this confusion, so common among utilitarians:--"Speaking generally, the acts which are called right do promote, or are supposed to promote general happiness, and the acts which are called wrong do diminish, or are supposed to diminish it. I say, therefore, that this is what the words 'right' and 'wrong' mean, just as the words 'up' and 'down' mean that which points from or towards the earth's centre of gravity, though they are used by millions who have not the least notion of the fact that such is their meaning, and though they were used for centuries and millenniums before any one was or even could be aware of it."[1] So, too, Bentham maintained that words like "ought," "right," and "wrong," have no meaning unless interpreted in accordance with the principle of utility;[2] and James Mill was of opinion that "the very morality" of the act lies, not in the sentiments raised in the breast of him who perceives or contemplates it, but in "the consequences of the act, good or evil, and their being {6} within the intention of the agent."[3] He adds that a rational assertor of the principle of utility approves of an action "because it is good," and calls it good "because it conduces to happiness."[4] This, however, is to invert the sequence of the facts, since, properly speaking, an act is called good because it is approved of, and is approved of by an utilitarian in so far as it conduces to happiness. [Footnote 1: Stephen, _Liberty_, _Equality_, _Fraternity_, p. 338.] [Footnote 2: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 4.] [Footnote 3: James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, pp. 5, 376.] [Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 368.]