influence of insane impulses; but with this subject we are not concerned at present. In this connection my object has been merely to show that the irresponsibility of the insane, in so far as it depends on intellectual derangement, has been generally recognised in proportion as their intellectual derangement has been recognised, and that the exceptions to this rule are explicable from beliefs which, though materially affecting the treatment of the insane, have no reference to the principle of responsibility itself. [Footnote 177: Howell, _Collection of State Trials_, xvi. 765.] [Footnote 178: Harris, _Principles of the Criminal Law_, p. 18. Kenny, _op. cit._ p. 53.] [Footnote 179: Clark and Finnelly, _Reports of Cases decided in the House of Lords_, x. 202.] [Footnote 180: _Ibid._ x. 211.] [Footnote 181: Maudsley, _op. cit._ p. 97.] [Footnote 182: Griesinger, _Mental Pathology and Therapeutics_, p. 72 _sq._ Maudsley, _op. cit._ p. 96.] * * * * * There are temporary states of mind in which the agent no more knows what he is doing than an idiot or a madman, such as somnambulism, narcosis, fury. For these states, of course, the rule holds good, that nobody is responsible for what he does in ignorance, although he may be responsible for his ignorance. Responsibility in connection with anger and rage will be more appropriately dealt with in another place. I shall here restrict myself to the case of drunkenness. A person is irresponsible, or only partly responsible, for what he does when drunk, according as he is ignorant of the nature of his act, as also in so far as the intoxicant contributed to the rise of some powerful impulse which determined his will. If he commits an offence in a state of extreme intoxication, he can reasonably be blamed only for what he did when sober. If he made himself drunk for the purpose of committing the offence, then the offence is intended, and he is equally responsible for his act as if he had accomplished it straightway. If he became intoxicated without any fault of his, for instance, if he did not know, and could not know, the intoxicating quality of the liquor which made him drunk, he is free from blame. But in other cases he is guilty of heedlessness, or rashness, or, if he foresaw the danger, of blamable indifference to {278} the probable consequences of his act. This is the clear theory of the question. But we cannot expect to find it accurately expressed in practice.