Among the Karens of India "men are not unfrequently killed in drunken broils; but such cases are not allowed by Karen custom to be a cause of action. No price can be demanded for persons who lose their lives in such circumstances. It is argued there was no malice, no intention to kill; and the person who died was perhaps as much to blame as the man who killed him; and people are not well responsible for what they do in a state of intoxication."[189] Among the Kandhs, "for wounds, however serious, given under circumstances of extreme provocation, or in a drunken squabble, slight compensation is awarded."[190] Among some of the Marshall Islanders blood-revenge is generally not taken for an act of homicide which has been committed in drunkenness, compensation being accepted instead.[191] So, also, according to the ancient law of the East Frisians, a man who has killed another when drunk is allowed "to buy off his neck by a sum of money paid to the king and to the relatives of the slain."[192] [Footnote 189: Mason, in _Jour. As. Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 146.] [Footnote 190: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 82.] [Footnote 191: Jung, quoted by Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv. 446.] [Footnote 192: _Das Ostfriesische Land-Recht_, iii. 18.] Roman law regarded drunkenness as a ground of extenuation;[193] the Jurist Marcian mentions _ebrietas_ as an example of _impetus_, thereby intimating that a drunken person, when committing a crime, should not be put on the same footing with an offender acting in cold blood, and calculating his act with clear consciousness.[194] In Canon law drunkenness is said to be a ground which deserves the indulgence of a reasonable judge, because whatever is done in that state is done without consciousness on the part of the actor.[195] Indeed, had not God shown {280} indulgence for the offence committed by Lot when drunk?[196] Partly on the authority of Roman law, partly on that of Canon law, the earliest practitioners of the Middle Ages followed the principle that drunkenness is a ground of extenuation; and this doctrine remained strongly rooted in the later jurisprudence, in which a drunken person was likened to one under the influence of sleep, or drunkenness was regarded as equivalent to insanity.[197] It was not until the sixteenth century that a mere general rule, with regard to drunkenness as a ground of extenuation, was felt to be insufficient. Since the time of Clarus, especially, the opinion began to prevail, that the effect of the highest degree of drunkenness was, indeed, to exempt from the punishment of _dolus_, but that the offender was still subject to the punishment of _culpa_, except in two cases, namely, first, when he inebriated himself intentionally, and with a consciousness that he might commit a crime while drunk, in which case the drunkenness was not allowed to be any ground of exculpation at all; and, secondly, when he became intoxicated without any fault on