Cudworth, Clarke, Price, and Reid are names which recall to our mind a theory according to which the morality of actions is perceived by the intellect, just as are number, diversity, causation, proportion. "Morality is eternal and immutable," says Richard Price. "Right and wrong, it appears, denote what actions are. Now whatever any thing is, that it is, not by will, or degree, or power, but by nature and necessity. Whatever a triangle or circle is, that it is unchangeably and eternally. . . . The same is to be said of right and wrong, of moral good and evil, as far as they express real characters of actions. They must immutably and necessarily belong to those actions of which they are truly affirmed."[6] And as having a real existence outside the mind, they can only be discerned by the understanding. It is true that this discernment is accompanied with an emotion: "Some impressions of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or disgust, generally attend our perceptions of virtue and vice. But these are merely their effects and concomitants, and not the perceptions themselves, which ought no more to be confounded with them, than a particular truth (like that for which Pythagoras offered a hecatomb) ought to be confounded with the pleasure that may attend the discovery of it."[7] [Footnote 6: Price, _Review of the Principal Questions in Morals_, pp. 63, 74 _sq._] [Footnote 7: _Ibid._ p. 63.] According to another doctrine, the moral predicates, though not regarded as expressions of "theoretical" truth, nevertheless derive all their import from reason from "practical" or "moral" reason, as it is variously {8} called. Thus Professor Sidgwick holds that the fundamental notions represented by the word "ought" or "right," which moral judgments contain expressly or by implication, are essentially different from all notions representing facts of physical or psychical experience, and he refers such judgments to the "reason," understood as a faculty of cognition. By this he implies "that what ought to be is a possible object of knowledge, _i.e._, that what I judge ought to be, must, unless I am in error, be similarly judged by all rational beings who judge truly of the matter." The moral judgments contain moral _truths_, and "cannot legitimately be interpreted as judgments respecting the present or future existence of human feelings or any facts of the sensible world."[8] [Footnote 8: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, pp. 25, 33 _sq._]