{14} Besides the relative uniformity of moral opinions, there is another circumstance which tempts us to objectivise moral judgments, namely, the authority which, rightly or wrongly, is ascribed to moral rules. From our earliest childhood we are taught that certain acts _are_ right and that others _are_ wrong. Owing to their exceptional importance for human welfare, the facts of the moral consciousness are emphasised in a much higher degree than any other subjective facts. We are allowed to have our private opinions about the beauty of things, but we are not so readily allowed to have our private opinions about right and wrong. The moral rules which are prevalent in the society to which we belong are supported by appeals not only to human, but to divine, authority, and to call in question their validity is to rebel against religion as well as against public opinion. Thus the belief in a moral order of the world has taken hardly less firm hold of the human mind than the belief in a natural order of things. And the moral law has retained its authoritativeness even when the appeal to an external authority has been regarded as inadequate. It filled Kant with the same awe as the star-spangled firmament. According to Butler, conscience is "a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority of being so."[16] Its supremacy is said to be "felt and tacitly acknowledged by the worst no less than by the best of men."[17] Adam Smith calls the moral faculties the "vicegerents of God within us," who "never fail to punish the violation of them by the torments of inward shame and self-condemnation; and, on the contrary, always reward obedience with tranquillity of mind, with contentment, and self-satisfaction."[18] Even Hutcheson, who raises the question why the moral sense should not vary in different men as the palate does, considers it {15} "to be naturally destined to command all the other powers."[19] [Footnote 16: Butler, 'Sermon II.--Upon Human Nature,' in _Analogy of Religion_, _&c._ p. 403.] [Footnote 17: Dugald Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man_, i. 302.] [Footnote 18: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 235.] [Footnote 19: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, i. 61.]