The origin and development of the moral ideas — John Shaqi
The origin and development of the moral ideasWestermarck, Edward
Philosophy
The origin and development of the moral ideas
Westermarck, Edward
Ethics; Ethics -- History; Prehistoric peoples
It is said that the authority of the moral law asserts itself every
time the law is broken, that virtue bears in itself its own reward,
and vice its own punishment. But, to be sure, conscience is a very
unjust retributer. The more a person habituates himself to virtue the
more he {16} sharpens its sting, the deeper he sinks in vice the more
he blunts it. Whilst the best men have the most sensitive consciences,
the worst have hardly any conscience at all. It is argued that the
habitual sinner has rid himself of remorse at a great cost;[21] but it
may be fairly doubted whether the loss is an adequate penalty for his
wickedness. We are reminded that men are rewarded for good and
punished for bad acts by the moral feelings of their neighbours. But
public opinion and law judge of detected acts only. Their judgment is
seldom based upon an exhaustive examination of the case. They often
apply a standard which is itself open to criticism. And the feelings
with which men regard their fellow-creatures, and which are some of
the main sources of human happiness and suffering, have often very
little to do with morality. A person is respected or praised, blamed
or despised, on other grounds than his character. Nay, the admiration
which men feel for genius, courage, pluck, strength, or accidental
success, is often superior in intensity to the admiration they feel
for virtue.
[Footnote 21: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, p. 103.]
In spite of all this, however, the supreme authority assigned to the
moral law is not altogether an illusion. It really exists in the minds
of the best, and is nominally acknowledged by the many. By this I do
not refer to the universal admission that the moral law, whether
obeyed or not, ought under all circumstances to be obeyed; for this is
the same as to say that what ought to be ought to be. But it is
recognised, in theory at least, that morality, either alone or in
connection with religion, possesses a higher value than anything else;
that rightness and goodness are preferable to all other kinds of
mental superiority, as well as of physical excellence. If this theory
is not more commonly acted upon, that is due to its being, in most
people, much less the outcome of their own feelings than of
instruction from the outside. It is ultimately traceable to some great
teacher whose own mind was ruled by the ideal of moral perfection, and
whose {17} words became sacred on account of his supreme wisdom, like
Confucius or Buddha,[22] or on religious grounds, like Jesus. The
authority of the moral law is thus only an expression of a strongly
developed, overruling moral consciousness. It can hardly, as Mr.
Sidgwick maintains, be said to "depend upon" the conception of the
objectivity of duty.[23] On the contrary, it must be regarded as a
cause of this conception--not only, as has already been pointed out,
where it is traceable to some external authority, but where it results
from the strength of the individual's own moral emotions. As clearness
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