The origin and development of the moral ideasWestermarck, Edward
Philosophy
The origin and development of the moral ideas
Westermarck, Edward
Ethics; Ethics -- History; Prehistoric peoples
Definitions of the term "conduct," p. 202 _sq._--The meaning of the
word "act," p. 203 _sq._--The meaning of the word "intention,"
p. 204.--There can be only one intention in one act, p. 204 _sq._ The
moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the
event, but to the intention, p. 205 _sq._--A person morally
accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. 206.--A deliberate wish
is a volition, p. 206 _sq._--The meaning of the word "motive,"
p. 207.--Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral
valuation, _ibid._--The motive of an act may be an intention, but an
intention belonging to another act, _ibid._--Even motives which
consist of non-volitional conations may indirectly exercise much
influence on moral judgments, p. 207 _sq._--Refutation of Mill's
statement that "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
action," p. 208 _sq._--Moral judgments really passed upon men as
acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract, p. 209.
--Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. 209 _sq._--Distinction
between forbearances and omissions, p. 210.--Moral judgments refer not
only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and
forbearances, but to omissions, p. 210 _sq._--Negligence,
heedlessness, and rashness, p. 211.--Moral judgments of blame
concerned with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is
attributed to a defect of the "will," p. 211 _sq._--Distinction
between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing
to refrain from doing and willing to do, p. 212.--The "known
concomitants of acts," p. 213.--Absence of volitions also gives rise
to moral praise, p. 213 _sq._--The meaning of the term "conduct,"
p. 214.--The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a
person's will, or character, conceived as the cause either of
volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. 214 _sq._--Moral
judgments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the
will, p. 215 _sq._
CHAPTER IX
THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF
EXTERNAL EVENTS
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