The origin and development of the moral ideasWestermarck, Edward
Philosophy
The origin and development of the moral ideas
Westermarck, Edward
Ethics; Ethics -- History; Prehistoric peoples
[Footnote 51: Concerning the Dacotahs, Prescott observes, "There are
cases where the Indians say retaliation is wrong, and they try to
prevent it" (Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes_, ii. 197).]
The aggressive character of moral disapproval has become more
disguised, not only by the more scrutinising attitude towards the
resentment and retaliation which distinguishes the moral consciousness
of a higher type, but by the different way in which the aggressiveness
displays itself. The infliction of suffering merely for the sake of
retribution is condemned, and the rule is laid down that we should
hate, not the sinner, but only the sin.
Punishment, which expresses more or less faithfully the moral
indignation of the society which inflicts it, is externally similar to
an act of revenge; it causes, or is intended {80} to cause, pain in
return for inflicted pain. For ages it was looked upon as a matter of
course that if a person had committed an offence he should have to
suffer for it. This is still the notion of the multitude, as also of a
host of theorisers, who, by calling punishment an expiation, or a
reparation, or a restoration of the disturbed equilibrium of justice,
only endeavour to give a philosophical sanction to a very simple fact,
the true nature of which they too often have failed to grasp. The
infliction of pain, however, is not an act which the moral
consciousness regards with indifference, even in the case of a
criminal; and to many enlightened minds with keen sympathy for human
suffering, it has appeared both unreasonable and cruel that the State
should wilfully torment him to no purpose. But whilst retributive
punishment has been condemned, punishment itself has been defended; it
is only looked upon in a different light, not as an end by itself, but
as a means of attaining an end. It is to be inflicted, not because
wrong has been done, but in order that wrong be not done. Its object
is held to be, either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal,
or by means of elimination or seclusion, to make it physically
impossible for him to commit fresh crimes.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive