These views were expressed already in Greek and Roman antiquity.[52] According to Plato, a reasonable man punishes for the sake of deterring from wickedness, or with a view to correcting the offender.[53] Aristotle looks upon punishment as a moral medicine.[54] Seneca maintains that the law, in punishing wrong, aims at three ends: "either that it may correct him whom it punishes, or that his punishment may render other men better, or that, by bad men being put out of the way, the rest may live without fear."[55] In modern times all these theories have had, and still have, their numerous adherents. According to Hugo Grotius, "men are so bound together by their common {81} nature, that they ought not to do each other harm, except for the sake of some good to be attained"; hence "man is not rightly punished by man merely for the sake of punishing"; advantage alone makes punishment right--"either the advantage of the offender, or of him who suffers by the offence, or of persons in general."[56] For a long time the view taken by Hobbes, that "the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour,"[57] remained the leading doctrine on the subject, among philosophers, as well as legislators. It was shared by Montesquieu,[58] Beccaria,[59] and filangieri,[60] by Anselm von Feuerbach[61] and Schopenhauer,[62] and, in the main, by Bentham.[63] During the nineteenth century the principle of determent was largely superseded by the principle of reformation; whilst certain contemporary criminologists--like some previous ones[64]--are of opinion that punishment should aim to repress crime by an "absolute" or "relative elimination" of the criminal, that is, in extreme cases by killing him, but generally by incarcerating him in a criminal lunatic asylum, or by banishing him for ever or for a certain period, or by interdicting him from a particular neighbourhood.[65] [Footnote 52: _Cf._ Laistner, _Das Recht in der Strafe_, p. 9 _sqq._; Thonissen, _Le droit pénal de la république Athénienne_, p. 418 _sqq._] [Footnote 53: Plato, _Protagoras_, p. 324. _Idem_, _Politicus_, p. 293. _Idem_, _Gorgias_, p. 479. _Idem_, _Leges_, ix. 854; xi. 934; xii. 944.] [Footnote 54: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, ii. 3. 4.] [Footnote 55: Seneca, _De clementia_, i. 22. _Cf._ _Idem_, _De ira_, i. 19.] [Footnote 56: Grotius, _De iure belli et pacis_, ii. 20. 4 _sqq._] [Footnote 57: Hobbes, _Leviathan_, ii. 28, p. 243.] [Footnote 58: Montesquieu, _Lettres Persanes_, 81.] [Footnote 59: Beccaria, _Dei delitti e delle pene_, _passim_.] [Footnote 60: filangieri, _La scienza della legislazione_, iii. 2. 27, vol. iv. 13 _sq._] [Footnote 61: von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, _Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen Peinlichen Rechts_, p. 38 _sqq._] [Footnote 62: Schopenhauer, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, ii. 683 _sqq._]