The origin and development of the moral ideasWestermarck, Edward
Philosophy
The origin and development of the moral ideas
Westermarck, Edward
Ethics; Ethics -- History; Prehistoric peoples
[Footnote 63: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 170
_sq._ n. 1: ". . . Example is the most important end of all." _Idem_,
_Rationale of Punishment_, p. 19 _sqq._]
[Footnote 64: See von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, _op. cit._ p. 40.]
[Footnote 65: Garofalo, _Criminologie_, p. 251 _sqq._ Ferri,
_Criminal Sociology_, p. 204 _sqq._]
The advocates of these various theories are unanimous in condemning
retributive punishment as wrong. Without the grounds of social
defence, says M. Guyau, "the punishment would be as blameworthy as the
crime, and . . . the lawgivers and the judges, by deliberately
condemning the guilty to punishment, would become their fellows."[66]
For my own part I believe, on the contrary, that those who would
venture to carry out all the consequences to which the theories of
social defence or of reformation might lead, would be regarded even as
more criminal than those they punished, not only by the {82}
opponents, but probably by the very supporters of the theories in
question. A brief statement of some of those consequences will, I
hope, suffice to prove that punishment can hardly be guided
exclusively by utilitarian considerations, but requires the sanction
of the retributive emotion of moral disapproval.
[Footnote 66: Guyau, _Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni
sanction_, p. 148.]
The principle of repressing crime by eliminating the criminal may at
once be put aside, because it has no reference to the _punishment_ of
criminals, although it contains a suggestion--and a most excellent one
indeed--as to the proper mode of treating them. Their exclusion from
the company of their fellow-men--not to speak of their elimination by
death--certainly entails suffering, but, according to the principle
with which we are dealing, this suffering is not _intended_. On the
other hand, punishment, in the ordinary sense of the word, always
involves an express intention to inflict pain, whatever be the object
for which pain is inflicted. We do not punish an ill-natured dog when
we tie him up so as to prevent him from doing harm, nor do we punish a
lunatic by confining him in a madhouse.
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