The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and WrongBrentano, Franz
Philosophy
The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong
Brentano, Franz
Ethics
Just as in the case of the feeling of compulsion, and in that of the
fear or hope of recompense, so also the thought of the command of an
external will cannot possibly be the sanction for law and morality.
11. But there are also commands in an essentially different sense;
commands in the sense in which we speak of the commands of logic
respecting our judgments and conclusions. We are not here concerned with
the will of logic, since a will logic manifestly has not, nor with the
will of the logician, to which we have in no way sworn allegiance. The
laws of logic are naturally valid rules of judging, that is to say, we
are obliged to conform to them, since conformity to these rules ensures
certainty in our judgments, whereas judgments diverging from these rules
are liable to error. What we therefore mean is a natural superiority
which thought-processes in conformity with law have over such as are
contrary to law. So also in ethics, we are not concerned with the
command of an external will but rather with a natural preference similar
to that in logic, and the law founded on that preference. This has been
emphasized not only by Kant but also by the majority of great thinkers
before him. Nevertheless there are still many--unfortunately even among
the adherents of the empirical school to which I myself belong--by whom
this fact has neither been rightly understood nor appreciated.
12. In what then lies this special superiority which gives to morality
its natural sanction? Some regarded it as, in a sense, external, they
believed its superiority to consist in beauty of appearance. The Greeks
called noble and virtuous conduct Τὀ καλὁν, the beautiful, and the
perfect man of honour καλοκἀγαθός; though none of the philosophers of
antiquity set up this aesthetic view as a criterion. On the other hand,
David Hume[11], among modern thinkers, has spoken of a moral sense of
the beautiful which acts as arbiter between the moral and the immoral,
while still more recently the German philosopher, Herbart,[12] has
subordinated ethics to aesthetics.
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