35. For, from the cases we adduced of preference qualified as right, the important proposition follows that the province of the highest practical good embraces everything which is subject to our rational operation in so far as a good can be realized in such matter. Not merely the self but also the family, the town, the state, the whole present world of life, even distant future times, may here be taken into account. All this follows from the principle of the summation of the good. To promote as far as possible the good throughout this great whole, that is manifestly the right end in life, towards which every act is to be ordered; that is the one, the highest command upon which all the rest depend.[43] Self-devotion and, on occasion, self-sacrifice are, therefore, duties; an equal good wherever it be, and therefore in the person of another also, is, in proportion to its value, and, therefore, everywhere equally to be loved, and jealousy and malignant envy are excluded. 36. And now, since all lesser goods are to be made subservient to the good of this widest sphere, light may also be shed from utilitarian considerations upon those dark regions where before we found a standard of choice wanting. If, for example, it was true that acts of insight and acts of noble love are not to be measured as to their inner worth in terms of one another, it is now clear that at any rate neither of these two sides may be entirely neglected at the expense of the other. If one person had perfect knowledge without noble love, and another perfect noble love without knowledge, neither would be able to use his gifts in the service of the still greater collective good. A certain harmonious development and exercise of all our noblest powers seems, therefore, from this point of view to be, at any rate, what we must strive after.[44] 37. And now after seeing how many duties of love towards the highest practical good come to light, we proceed to the origin of duties of law. That association which renders possible a division of labour is the indispensable condition of the advancement of the highest good as we have learnt to understand it. Man therefore is morally destined to live in society, and it is easily demonstrable that limits must exist in order that one member of society may not be more of a hindrance than a help to another,[45] and that these limits (though much in this respect is settled by considerations of natural common-sense) require to be more exactly marked by positive laws, and need the further security and support of public authority. And while in this way our natural insight demands and sanctions positive law in general, it may, in particular, raise demands on the fulfillment of which depends the measure of the blessing which the state of law is to bring with it.