The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong — John Shaqi
The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and WrongBrentano, Franz
Philosophy
The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong
Brentano, Franz
Ethics
[7] (_p. 5_). _Dig._ 1. 8, 9.
[8] (_p. 6_). Amongst the numerous adherents of this view and one of
its best advocates is J. S. Mill in his _Utilitarianism_, chap. iii.
[9] (_p. 6_). Here also, along with many others, J. S. Mill may
be cited. The motives of hope and fear are, according to him, the
_external_; the motives first described, the feelings developed by
habit, the internal sanction. _Utilitarianism_, chap. iii.
[10] (_p. 7_). Cf. espec. here a discussion in James Mill’s _Fragment
on Mackintosh_, printed by J. S. Mill in the second edition of his
_Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind_, vol. ii. p. 309 seq.;
and Grote’s powerful essay published by A. Bain under the title,
“_Fragments on Ethical Subjects_, by the late George Grote, F.R.S.,”
being a selection from his posthumous papers, London, 1876; Espec.
Essay 1, _On the Origin and Nature of Ethical Sentiment_.
[11] (_p. 9_). D. Hume, _An Enquiry concerning the Principles of
Morals_, London, 1751.
[12] (_p. 9_). Herbart, _Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie_,
81 seq. _Collected Works_, vol. i. p. 124 seq.
[13] (_p. 9_). This comparison with logic should be my best defence
against the charge of placing Herbart’s doctrine in a false light.
Were the logical criterion to consist in judgments of taste
experienced on the appearance of thought-processes in accordance with
or opposition to rule, it would then, in comparison with what it
actually is (the internal self-evidence of a process in accordance
with rule) have to be called external. Similarly Herbart’s criterion
of ethics is rightly characterized as external, however loudly
Herbartians may insist that in the judgment of taste which arises
spontaneously on the contemplation of certain relations of will, an
inner superiority regarding these relations is recognizable.
[14] (_p. 10_). In his _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, Kant
enunciates his Categorical Imperative in the following forms: “Act
only in accordance with that maxim which you can at the same time
will should become a universal law,” and “Act as if the maxim of your
action were by your will to be raised to a universal law.”
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