[20] (_p. 13_). The question of the grounds of this division is discussed in more detail in my _Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte_ (1874, Bk. ii. chap. vi.; cf. also chap. i. section 5). The statements there made regarding this division I still consider to be substantially correct in spite of many modifications respecting points of detail. [21] (_p. 13_). Meditat. iii. “Nunc autem ordo videtur exigere, ut prius omnes meas cogitationes (all psychical acts) in certa genera distribuam.... Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit _ideae_ nomen, ut cum hominem, vel chimaeram, vel coelum, vel angelum, vel Deum cogito; aliae vero alias quasdam praeterea formas habent, ut cum volo cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum nego, semper quidem aliquam rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatione complector; et ex his aliae _voluntates_ sive _affectus_ aliae autem _judicia_ appellantur.” Strangely enough this clear passage has not prevented Windelband (_Strassb. philos. Abhandl._ p. 171) from ascribing to Descartes the view that the judgment is an act of volition. What led him astray is a discussion in the fourth Meditation on the influence of the will in the formation of judgment. Even scholastics like Suarez had ascribed too much to this influence, and Descartes goes so far in exaggeration of this dependence that he considers every judgment (even the self-evident judgments) as the work of the will. But to “produce the judgment” and “to be the judgment” are yet manifestly not one and the same. And, therefore, although Descartes, in the passage cited, allows his view as to the influence of the will to appear, and probably it is only on this account that he assigns to the judgment the third place in the fundamental classification of psychical phenomena, yet none the less he says without contradiction: _aliae_ voluntates--_aliae_ judicia appellantur. More illusive are a couple of passages in his later writings, i.e. in his _Principia Philosophiae_ (i. 32), published three years after the Meditations, and in a work also written three years later: Notae in Programma quoddam, sub finem Anni 1647 in Belgio editum, cum hoc Titulo: Explicatio mentis humanae sive animae rationalis, ubi explicatur quid sit, et quid esse possit.” Particularly might the passage in the _Principles_ lead to the opinion that Descartes must have changed his view, and it is astonishing that Windelband has not appealed to this passage rather than to that in the Meditations. We read here:--Ordines _modi cognitandi_ quos in nobis experimur, _ad duos generales_ referri possunt; quorum unus est, _perceptio sive operatio intellectus_; alius vero _volitio sive operatio voluntatis_. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intellegere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipiendi; _ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi_.