As to Descartes’ real view, therefore, there can be no doubt; his doctrine has not in this respect suffered the slightest change. It only remains, therefore, to come to an understanding of his obviously variable modes of expression, and this is, I believe, solved incontrovertibly in the following manner. Descartes, while regarding will and judgment as two classes differing fundamentally, none the less finds that in contradistinction to the first fundamental class--that of ideas--these have something in common. In the third Meditation he designates (cf. the above passage) as the common element the fact that although essentially based upon an idea, in both alike there is contained a further special form. In the fourth Meditation a further common character appears, i.e. that the will decides concerning them; not only can it determine and suspend its own acts, but also those of the judgment. It is this common character which he was bound to regard as especially, indeed all important, in the first part of the _Principles_, xxix.-xlii. Accordingly, he classes them, in opposition to the ideas (which he calls operationes intellectus) under the term operationes voluntatis. In the Notae to the Programma he calls them distinctly in the same sense, “determinationes voluntatis.” “Ego enim, cum viderem, praeter perceptionem, quae praerequiritur ut judicemus, opus esse affirmatione vel negatione ad formam judicii constituendam, _nobisque saepe esse liberum ut cohibeamus assensionem_, etiamsi rem percipiamus, ipsum actum judicandi, qui non nisi in assensu, hoc est in affirmatione vel negatione consistit, non retuli ad perceptionem intellectus sed ad determinationem voluntatis.” He does not even hesitate in the _Principles_ to term both these two classes of _modi cogitandi_, “_modi volendi_” the context seeming sufficiently to indicate that he means only to express thereby the fact that they fall within the domain of the will. In further support of this explanation we may compare the scholastic terminology into which Descartes as a young man was initiated. It was customary to denote under the term _actus voluntatis_ not merely the movement of the will itself but also the act performed in obedience to the will. In accordance with this custom, the _actus voluntatis_ fell into two classes; the _actus elicitus voluntatis_ and the _actus imperatus voluntatis_. In a similar manner Descartes groups the class which, according to him, was only possible as an _actus imperatus_ of the will along with his _actus elicitus_. There is here, therefore, no question of a common fundamental character of the intentional relation.