Great, however, as were the pains I then took to set the teaching in a clear light and to show every former view untenable, my success so far has been slight. Apart from isolated individuals, I have been just as little able to convince the philosopher, as Miklosich, in his first edition, was able to convince philologists. Where a prejudice has, during centuries, become ever more and more firmly rooted, where a doctrine has penetrated even to the primary school, when a theory has come to be regarded as fundamental upon which much else rests, and so, as it were, by its weight rendered the foundation immovable, in such a case, it is not to be expected that the error will immediately disappear as soon as its refutation is established; on the contrary, it is to be feared that distrust of the new view will be so great, as not even to admit of a closer examination being made regarding the grounds on which it rests. And yet when two investigators completely independent of each other agree in their testimony, when by quite different paths they arrive at the same goal, it may be hoped that this concurrence will not be regarded as a mere coincidence, but that a more careful attention will be bestowed upon the arguments on either side. I hope that this will be so in the case of the new edition of Miklosich, in which I am glad to see regard paid to my own work. The agreement with regard to the main points makes subordinate points, in respect of which we differ, of less moment. I shall, notwithstanding, briefly touch on these. Miklosich has termed those simple propositions, in which there is contained no combination of subject and predicate, and in the recognition of which I am in agreement with him, “subjectless propositions.” I am not able entirely to approve his _use_ of the term and the _grounds_ which he has given for its use.