The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and WrongBrentano, Franz
Philosophy
The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong
Brentano, Franz
Ethics
Subject and predicate are correlative conceptions and stand or fall
together. A proposition which is truly without a subject must with equal
right be regarded as without a predicate. It does not therefore seem to
me quite fitting that Miklosich should always term such propositions
subjectless, and it is quite incorrect when he calls them mere
predicative propositions. (Cf. pp. 3, 25, 26, and elsewhere.) This might
suggest the view that he likewise believes a second conception (the
subject) is understood though not expressed, had he not in the most
decided manner denied this (p. 3 seq. and elsewhere); or that he
regarded such propositions as stunted forms of categorical propositions,
and the latter form as the original, had he not expressly refuted this
also (p. 13 seq.). His view rather seems to be, that the natural
development from the simple to the categorical form in thinking and
speaking is generally accomplished in such a way that the notion which
stands alone in the former proposition is combined with a second as
subject. “The subjectless propositions,” he says, p. 25, “are
propositions which consist only of a predicate, of what, in the natural
process of thought-formation must, in a great number of propositions, be
regarded as the prius, for which a subject may, but not necessarily
_must_ be sought.”
But this also can hardly be right, and the expression “subject” scarcely
seems to favour this view. That which forms the basis is, of course,
certainly that which in the construction of the judgment stands first.
The temporal succession of the words also agrees ill with such a view,
since, in the categorical proposition, we usually begin with the
subject. In opposition to such a view it may also be contended that the
emphasis usually falls upon the predicate (and Trendelenburg has made
use of this to indicate that the predicate is the main conception, and
even with exaggeration goes on to say: “We think in predicates,” cf. p.
19). If the predicative conception is what is newly added, it will,
accordingly, be the object of greater interest. On the other hand, we
would be compelled to expect exactly the opposite if the notion of the
subject contained the newly added moment.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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