The origins of art; a psychological & sociological inquiryHirn, Y. (Yrjö)
Philosophy
The origins of art; a psychological & sociological inquiry
Hirn, Y. (Yrjö)
Aesthetics; Art -- Philosophy; Art, Primitive
For a satisfactory explanation of our emotions it would no doubt be
desirable to have all the complicated physiological concomitants
reduced to simple terms of functional enhancement and functional
arrest. Such a reduction can, however, be undertaken only in a few
favourable cases. We can easily see, for instance, that in pride and
humiliation a series of perceptions and ideas have brought about
conditions of facilitated and checked activity similar to those which,
in sensational pleasure-pain, are created by simple physiological
stimuli.[61] We may also agree with Lehmann when he endeavours to
prove that the pain a child experiences when its mother leaves its
bedside can be reduced to a sensation of arrested activity.[62] And
we may in the same way explain our own feelings after losses which,
from our point of view, are more serious, as largely due to the fact
that an occasion of activity for our senses, thoughts, or bodily
powers has been suddenly withdrawn. But it would be too laborious to
enter upon such an analysis of all our compound emotions, and it is
also superfluous. Even when the organic conditions of pleasure and
pain cannot be detected among the intricate mass of intellectual and
volitional elements which make up what we can observe of an emotion,
we must still, from analogy, conclude that some kind of functional
enhancement or arrest corresponds to the feeling-tone.
Seeing, then, that what we may call “pure feeling” remains the same
in all possible combinations, we must expect to meet with the same
phenomena in connection with the manifestations of the higher emotions
and sentiments, as those already described in case of simple pain or
pleasure. It is true that in fully formed anger, joy, contempt, and
so on, the tendency to expression for expression’s sake—as when a
child laughs or dances for mere joy—is seldom found pure and unmixed.
But even in such complex states we may in the abstract distinguish
the impulse directly and inherently connected with the physiological
change—the impulse which tends _automatically_ to bring out the tone of
pleasure with more prominence or to relieve the tone of pain—from all
the conscious and volitional activities by which the external cause of
the feeling is either approached or avoided. We have only to remember
that, as was the case with sensation-feelings, those intentional
movements which are directly or by virtue of association connected
with an emotion will always work in the same direction as the purely
automatic expression.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account