In the future as in the past, the want of harbours directly on the Channel would strangle our activity beyond the seas. An independent Belgium would continue to be a _tête de pont_ to England, a point from which to attack us. If the natural line of fortifications of France were left in the hands of the French, there would be a permanent menace to our frontiers; and Russia, if she emerged from the war without loss of territory, would underestimate our ability and power to prevent her doing injury to our interests, while, on the other hand, the failure to win new agricultural territories on our Eastern frontier would diminish the possibility of strengthening the defensive power of Germany against Russia by a sufficient increase of the German population. We have the honour to draw Your Excellency’s attention to the views expressed above, which are not confined to the undersigned Corporations, but are widely held—possibly with occasional variations in detail—in many German circles which have not as yet publicly expressed them, and at the same time to inform you that we have simultaneously communicated this petition to the Ministries of the various Federated States. As a supplement to this Memorandum, we must here lay special stress on the fact that the political, military and economic objects, which the German people must strive after in the interests of the security of their future, are inseparably connected with one another. It is clear, to start with, that the attainment of our great political objects depends on the offensive power and the successes of our army. But precisely our experiences in this war prove, beyond any doubt, that our military successes, particularly in a long war, and their further exploitation depend to a large extent upon the economic strength and ability of our people. If German agriculture had not been in a position to secure the food of the people despite all the efforts of our enemies, and if German manufacturers, German inventive genius and German technical skill had not been able to render us independent of foreign countries in the most different spheres, then, notwithstanding the brilliant successes of our victorious troops, we should have had to give way eventually in the struggle which has been forced upon us, if indeed we should not have been defeated already. Hence it follows that even those demands, which seem at first sight to possess a purely economic significance, must be viewed in the light of the urgent necessity for the greatest possible increase of our national strength, and also from a military standpoint.