This new order of things lashed Berlin into a fury which though outwardly restrained was none the less intense because the only group (Turkey and Bulgaria) which was still under German influence, was bound to remain for a very long time to come practically impotent and powerless to make singly any attempt against the other group which favoured the Entente. Indeed, Turkey, which in her defeats had lost almost the whole of her military stores, could hardly, at the beginning of 1914, put 250,000 men under arms. Her financial difficulties were such that, if left to her own resources, it would have taken her many years to replace her military power on a solid basis. Bulgaria was in a similar financial predicament. Besides, if she had taken action it would have been at great risk to herself, in as much as those states which profited by the Bukarest Treaty (Roumania, Serbia and Greece), surrounding as they do (see the arrows of the map) Bulgaria on three sides, could then have delivered a concentric attack on Sofia. Finally, great was the disproportion of men eligible for the army or capable of bearing arms between the two groups. +------------------------+-------------------------+ | Germanophile Group. | Group of the Entente. | | | | | Turkey 250,000 | Greece 400,000 | | Bulgaria 550,000 | Serbia 400,000 | | | Montenegro 50,000 | | | Roumania 600,000 | | ------- | --------- | | 800,000 | 1,450,000 | +------------------------+-------------------------+ These figures, taken in conjunction with the geographical situation, show clearly that, left to its own resources, the Germanophile group could attempt no attack on the Entente group. The new balance of military forces in the Balkans which was the outcome of the Bukarest treaty, therefore reduced almost to naught Germany’s power of intrigue in the Peninsula. Had peace reigned for a few years, the new Balkan situation would have been consolidated and the obstacle to Pangerman ambition in the East would have been still more serious. It was for these varied reasons that Berlin decided to intervene directly. Without doubt Serbia was the pivot on which turned the new Balkanic equilibrium. It was therefore decided to destroy her without delay, kindling at the same time the European conflagration, and thus by one single blow to accomplish the plan of 1911. The Bukarest treaty was signed on the tenth of August, 1913. On November 6th, 1913, King Albert of Belgium was at Potsdam, and the Kaiser said to him that in his opinion war with France was near and unavoidable (see Baron Beyen’s _L’Allemagne avant la Guerre_, p. 24). * * * * *