in the result, as the notes held in reserve are well known to be just as profitable in increasing the efficiency of the deposits, as if they had formed a part of the circulation itself. [B] The interest occasionally paid to the Bank for its advances on Deficiency Bills is too trifling in amount to require a reference to it in the text. The case of the country banks of issue is very different from that of the Bank of England. The only equivalent which they render in return for the privilege of issue, so far at least as we are aware, consists in the payment of stamp duty, and composition in lieu thereof; and the total amount derived from those imposts is less than £40,000 per annum. Now, the employment of the £8,000,000 of country notes, in loans and under discount, at the rate just assigned, would return an annual profit of more than £300,000; and for this amount of profit the payment of £40,000 in stamp duty, must be considered a very inadequate compensation. In like manner, if we extend our view so as to embrace the total authorized issues of unrepresented notes throughout the United Kingdom, it will be seen that while the profits arising out of those issues (which are more than £30,000,000) cannot fall short of one million sterling, the principal equivalent rendered by the banks of issue in the aggregate, consists of the two services just mentioned as performed by the Bank of England, and two similar services performed by the Bank of Ireland; the vast majority of those banks receiving the full benefit of the right of issue, with the exception of a trivial per-centage upon the annual profits. In this respect therefore, as in the preceding, it is abundantly evident that our present monetary system is very much in need of a comprehensive amendment. There are several methods which might be adopted for rendering the issue of unrepresented notes more decidedly profitable to the State. One of these will readily suggest itself it is that of allowing all the existing banks of issue to retain their privilege on condition of paying Government a certain equitable rate of interest on the amount of notes which they should hold in circulation. This plan would undoubtedly possess the single advantage of producing as small a dislocation in the movements of the commercial machinery of the country generally, as is perhaps consistent with the introduction of any important alteration. In nearly every other respect, however, it would be equally objectionable with the present system. It would furnish no additional guarantee either for the security of the genuine country notes, or against the circulation of counterfeit notes; and these are defects which would alone be sufficient to condemn any system in which they were not satisfactorily provided for.