Now very few words will suffice to show that our proposed system would be as well adapted to the exigencies of those occasional advances, as to the more normal requirements of the circulation. It must, we think, be conceded, that if an advance be made for some definite individual purpose, such as those referred to, the money so advanced will not continue any length of time in circulation, but will return into the Bank without producing a sensible effect on prices or on credit. But this being granted, it clearly follows that a system which is only intended to prevent such an over issue as would have the effect of raising prices, ought not to interfere with some indispensable advance which would necessarily be temporary, and would therefore exert no influence on prices. Be that as it may, however, our system would be equally applicable to both cases. For, if the advance be really for a permanent purpose, its effect will be precisely similar to any other advance of equal extent; if considerable, it will raise the rate of interest and thereby diminish the amount of accommodation required in other quarters; so that the currency in the hands of the public will still be preserved at an expedient level. On the other hand, if the advance be made for some individual application, the governmental charge will only be imposed for the few days during which the money will be actually in circulation, and will therefore cause no sensible inconvenience to the Bank; while the necessary effect of its imposition, will be either to recover the money at the termination of that period, or else, by inducing the Bank to raise its rate of interest, to produce a contraction equivalent to the amount of expansion. In short, the operation of the proposed system, will be such that unless the amount of notes advanced in such circumstances be really required for the purpose of currency, they will not continue in circulation, but will inevitably return to the Bank at the earliest possible period.