For him, as for Kant, the law of man’s will is the end that determines each act of will; since to be moral the will must have in itself its own law and its own end. The word moral can here have but one equivalent, namely, spiritual, that is to say _possessing value_. Morality so understood is an attribute of the entire life of mind, which must have an absolute value—be it truth, beauty, or goodness—such value being meaningless if it does not correspond to an ought to be, imperative _hic et nunc_ as a consequence of liberty. Moreover, this binding imperativeness is universal—for imperative means necessary, and there can be no necessity without universality. The good is, in conclusion, the value of man’s spirit in its dialectical actuality; it may be termed the most concrete form of spiritual reality. Any spiritual act is moral in so far as it is mind’s realisation; consequently the negation of morality cannot be understood without understanding this realisation, which is the spiritual process or development of mind as society. The good is development; and as such it implies evil as its negativity.[11] Light and shadow, good and evil; in both cases the second term is the negative of the first. And herein lies all the tragedy of mind. Spiritual life is a complex of light and shadow, a constant struggle of the particular with the universal. Negativity opposes itself to positivity, evil to good, as the _particular_ to the universal. Yet it is through their conflict and opposition that spiritual life realises itself, and this realisation is entrusted to the individual, who in and through his very particularity is the agent of the universal will. Obviously, if we take man, the individual man, in his pure empiricalness, he can do nothing without superhuman help. But this notion of man, which is the ground of all the abstract forms of egoism, individualism and anarchy, is a mere fancy. No single man can so be deprived of the divine light of intelligence as not to know of his own existence as a person, as a self, and in the very act of knowing himself as such to assert what is universal in him. Man in short is universal in so far as he does not belong to nature, a pure object of knowledge, but is a subject. So that his moral law is nothing superadded to him _ab extra_, it is the life granted to him by Providence realising itself.