(2.) The demand made upon him that he should let the people go was based in part at least on the religious duty of sacrificing to God in the wilderness (Ex. 5: 1, 3)――an entirely appropriate demand――one which Pharaoh ought to have appreciated, and one which would be more likely to have weight with him than any other. For he was himself a worshiper of his own gods; he knew the strength of the religious element in human nature; he was able to recognize the universal rights of conscience by which every man may claim to worship God according to his own convictions of duty. If Pharaoh would not yield to this request he would yield to none. The policy pursued was, therefore, the most hopeful and the least likely to arouse opposition. (3.) Even the severest honesty did not require that the Lord should put this demand in its most revolting form in the outset. True, he might have said from the beginning: “My people shall never return”; but this would have at once foreclosed all hope of gaining Pharaoh’s consent. (4.) If the question of the return of the people was thus left a very little open――or more correctly, was not peremptorily closed, it served the better to test the heart of Pharaoh. It left the way open to ply him with inducements most likely to be successful; and at the same time if he proved obstinate and self-willed, he might show it by bantering over the conditions, higgling as tradesmen and their customers sometimes do over the price, negotiating like diplomatists for the most favorable terms. But this was the fault of Pharaoh, not of God. (5.) Most frequently the demand was made in these significant words: “Let my people go that they may serve me” (Ex. 8: 1, 20, and 9: 1, 13). Israel is my son; his service is due to me and I claim it (Ex. 4: 22, 23). You have no right to his services; I demand therefore that you let my son go that he may serve me.――――This is at least sufficiently definite, and is by no means open to the slightest imputation of lacking in the point of honesty. 5. _The hardening of Pharaoh’s heart._ In this topic, as in the one next preceding, the point of chief interest is the moral one――that which locates the moral responsibility for the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart――that which defines and places truthfully the really responsible agency in the case. Was this hardening the work of God, by his immediate hand? Was it wrought by his power so exclusively and in such modes as to overrule and throw out of account Pharaoh’s own responsible agency? Or was the responsible agency that of Pharaoh only, altogether his and his alone? Did he harden his own heart, in the exercise of his own free will, in carrying out the purpose and desire of his own soul, essentially as other sinners and as all sinners do? This question is one of immensely vital moment. Let us approach it with both care and candor. We may reach the true answer by studying, (1.) The history of the case;