Answer is made, third: that just as the reverend archbishop by his arguments strives at Madrid and Roma to subject the regulars to his visitation in what concerns them as parish priests, he may also plan to subject them in all that concerns morals and life. "For if they behave ill, it is not right to permit such conduct; and if their conduct is exemplary, what matter is it if he visits them, and approves them, in order to report on them with praises?" The reply which the reverend archbishop will make to this argument can with more reason be applied as the reply and solution to his own. The religious orders add that, even though the praises of the reverend archbishop are and always will be worthy of the utmost appreciation, yet they set a much greater value on following the counsel of the apostle about each man abiding in his own calling [32]--which was not to be curas--than to be curas and obtain those praises with the risk of the troubles that have been considered. Nor is it right, by the same mode of argument as that of the reverend archbishop, that the religious orders should not further make evident the importance of their justice and of their labors. This prelate greatly resented that the reverend bishop, the delegate and judge of his Holiness for cases of appeals, should go to Manila and exercise his functions, issuing various acts; and the said reverend archbishop also took steps to have the delegate depart immediately from his archbishopric, and said (and wrote to Europa) that the religious orders were trying to keep the delegate there as their judge-conservator. It is here where his own argument presses: either the procedure of the reverend archbishop was just, or it was not. If it were just, what did it matter that he had before him a judge with authority from the pope, and must deliver to this judge the documents which he demanded, so that as a judge so superior he might confirm them, and make a report on them with commendations? If the archbishop's conduct were not just, as little just was it that he should go beyond his obligation, in order to obstruct rightful jurisdiction. The reverend archbishop also refused to the religious orders all the copies of documents and the attested statements which they asked from him in regard to the visitation which he planned and began, but from which he desisted. If what the reverend archbishop did and decreed was just, what mattered it that he should command the said copies and statements to be given to parties so eminent and worthy of respect as were five religious provinces? If it were not just, why were these decrees made and executed?