It is taken for granted, Sir, as a maxim which experience has shown to be infallible in all America, that the means for the preservation and extension of the Catholic faith are the same as were employed for its first introduction, which was most prosperous because the ardent zeal of the gospel ministers was united with the power and arms of his Majesty (whom may God preserve), by which the progress of the faith was assured. [On this ground] it is very evident that in these regions it is not possible to improve, or even to preserve, the peoples who are already conquered and reduced, because no attention has been paid to maintaining the military posts, or building any new fortifications; on the other hand, in some places and provinces even the little forts that they possessed have been entirely removed, and in others the number of officers and soldiers designated for their defense from any hostile invasion has been diminished. The effect of this retrenchment, and of not reëstablishing the old military posts with the number of soldiers that is judged necessary, and with the military and food supplies which necessity and natural law prescribed for a suitable defense, is the reason why great destruction and losses from infidels and apostates are suffered and lamented. This has been experienced in the provinces of Cagayan and Zambales, as it appears, for the lack of the arms and defenses which in former times were sufficient for the defense of the faithful converts, and for attacking the hostile infidels--and even for chastising sometimes their wicked acts, as the rigor of justice demands. Today the converted Indians and other vassals of your Majesty are exposed to the dangers of fire and death and captivity which have been experienced in these past years, nor have our people had any other way [of escape] than to contract for the payment of a certain amount of tribute every year to the hostile Indians--an agreement in every way unbecoming and injurious to the reputation and credit of his Majesty's arms, so entrusted [to our Spaniards] by his royal self. There is this same lack of arms and supplies in the provinces and military posts of Yloilo, Cebu, Caraga, Calamianes, Yligan, and other forts; and from this the only benefit that can result is the very small one that his Majesty will save the expenses of reëstablishing posts and paying soldiers, and put a stop to another evil (likewise a small one), which is the losses occasioned to the poor by the idleness and license of the soldiers--but if this had to be attended to, there would be an end to all the military posts and garrisons which are maintained for the general welfare, the protection of the vassals, and the warfare (offensive and defensive) which natural law permits. Moreover, it is an obligation [and] characteristic of princes that they do not seek or desire the trifling evil mentioned, and as little the advantage of avoiding some expense--which cannot be done without violating that