by the lasting agreement of the patrons and of those summoned to obtain the properties by virtue of the clause of reversion, although in strict rigor of law the document of the foundation ought to take precedence over any act and any submission of its natural guardians. For the concrete matter of our opinion, we have only to declare that we do not believe that the former more or less extreme mildness of the patrons in the presence of the interference, which rejected the foundation, weakens the actions of the patronage of the college and of the ecclesiastical province favored by the clause of reversion in order to demand the observance of the foundation, if, perchance, the ministry of the colonies, exercising powers which indubitably belong to it, reorganize the instruction of the university without considering the religious community of the Dominicans. Even in the hypothesis of considering as illegal the tolerances or concessions of former times, the foundation, pure and simple, is the criterion and only norm with which the dispute can be adjusted. The second point of the conference offers no difficulty in whatever concerns the existence of a legal means for opposing a resolution of a government contrary to the native autonomy of the college. Leaving aside the attributes of the ministry to direct the services of education as it deems most suitable, whenever they are sustained by the public funds, the opposition, if it limit itself to the use of the properties and funds from private origin, which today endow the institution, would have a legal mean beyond any doubt, to demand the strict observance of the law of foundation. What would this mean be, or which of the two possible means appears more efficacious? Would it be by bringing the complaint before the court of contencioso-administrativo [170] or before the ordinary justice?