The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elementsProclus
Philosophy
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Proclus
Euclid. Elements; Platonists
If then, mathematical species do not subsist by material abstraction,
nor by a collection of those common properties inherent in individuals;
nor are at all, in their origin, posterior to sensibles, nor derived
in any manner from them: it is necessary that the soul should either
deduce them from herself, or from intellect; or lastly, from herself
and intellect united. But if from herself alone, Whence do the
images of intellectual species arise; whence do they derive their
middle nature, linking, as it were, the divisible and indivisible
essence together; if they do not participate the fullness of entity
from primary essences? Lastly, how, upon this hypothesis, are the
first exemplars, paradigms, or ideas, which subsist in intellect,
the principles of universals? But if they are derived from intellect
alone into the soul, how can the soul remain self-operative, and
self-motive, if her inherent reasons flow from an external source, and
are regulated by its operations? And in what respect does the soul
differ from matter, which is all things in mere dormant capacity,
but generates nothing appertaining to material species? It remains,
therefore, that the soul deduces these species from herself, and
intellect; and that she is the absolute consummation of the forms which
originate from intellectual exemplars, but which are allotted from
themselves a transition to permanent being. The soul, therefore, is by
no means to be compared to a smooth tablet, void of all reasons; but
she is an ever-written tablet, herself inscribing the characters in
herself, of which she derives an eternal plenitude from intellect.
For soul is a certain subordinate intellect, revolving round an
intellect prior to herself, formed to its image, and participating its
divine irradiations. If then, this superior intellect is all things
intellectually, soul will all things animally; if the first exists as
the exemplar, soul will be as its image; if as contracted and united
in itself, soul as divisible and expanded. And this is what Plato
understood, when in his Timæus, he composes the soul of the world
from all things, dividing her according to harmonical reasons, and
analogies; assigning to her the first principles effective of figures,
I mean the right and circular line, and giving an intellectual motion
to her inherent circles. All mathematical species, therefore, have a
primary subsistence in the soul: so that, before sensible numbers,
there are to be found in her inmost recesses, self-moving numbers;
vital figures, prior to the apparent, ideal proportions of harmony
previous to concordant sounds; and invisible orbs, prior to the bodies
which revolve in a circle. So that soul is the prolific abundance of
all these, and is another ornament producing herself, and produced
from a proper principle, filling herself with life, and at the same
time filled from the demiurgus of the universe, is an incorporeal
and indistant manner. When, therefore, she produces and unfolds
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