The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elementsProclus
Philosophy
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Proclus
Euclid. Elements; Platonists
equalities, applications, excesses, defects, and the like. But its
petitions and axioms, by which it demonstrates every particular are,
this, to draw a right line from any point to any point; and that,
if from equals you take away equals, the remainders will be equal;
together with the petitions and axioms consequent to these. Hence,
not every problem nor thing sought is geometrical, but such only as
flow from geometric principles. And he who is reproved and convicted
from these, is convinced as a geometrician. But whoever is convinced
from principles different from these, is not a geometrician, but is
foreign from the geometric contemplation. But the objects of the
non-geometric investigation, are of two kinds. For the thing sought
for, is either from entirely different principles, as we say that a
musical enquiry is foreign from geometry, because it emanates from
other suppositions, and not from the principles of geometry: or it is
such as uses, indeed, geometrical principles, but at the same time
perversely, as if any one should say, that parallels coincide. And on
this account, geometry also exhibits to us instruments of judging, by
which we may know what things are consequent to its principles, and
what those are which fall from the truth of its principles: for some
things attend geometrical, but others arithmetical principles. And why
should we speak of others, since they are far distant from these? For
one science is more certain than another (as Aristotle says[99]) that,
indeed, which emanates from more simple suppositions, than that which
uses more various principles; and that which tells the _why_,
than that which knows only the simple existence of a thing; and that
which is conversant about intelligibles, than that which touches and
is employed about sensibles. And according to these definitions of
certainty, arithmetic is, indeed, more certain than geometry, since its
principles excel by their simplicity. For unity is void of position,
with which a point is endued. And a point, indeed, when it receives
position, is the principle of geometry: but unity, of arithmetic. But
geometry is more certain than spherics; and arithmetic, than music.
For these render universally the causes of those theorems, which are
contained under them. Again, geometry is more certain than mechanics,
optics, and catoptrics. Because these discourse only on sensible
objects. The principles, therefore, of geometry and arithmetic, differ,
indeed, from the principles of other sciences; but the hypotheses of
these two, alternately differ and agree according to the difference we
have already described. Hence, also, with respect to the theorems which
are demonstrated in these sciences, some are, indeed, common to them,
but others peculiar. For the theorem which says, _every proportion
may be expressed_, alone belongs to arithmetic; but by no means
to geometry: since this last science contains things which cannot be
expressed[100].
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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