The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elementsProclus
Philosophy
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Proclus
Euclid. Elements; Platonists
But oftentimes, some denominate all these hypotheses,
in the same manner as the Stoics call every simple enunciation an
axiom. So that, according to their opinion, hypotheses also will
be axioms; but, according to the opinion of others, axioms will be
called suppositions. Again, such things as flow from principles are
divided into problems and theorems. The first, indeed, containing the
origin, sections, ablations, or additions of figures, and all the
affections with which they are conversant; but the other exhibiting
the accidents essential to each figure. For, as things effective of
science, participate of contemplation, in the same manner things
contemplative previously assume problems in the place of operations.
But formerly some of the ancient mathematicians thought that all
geometrical propositions should be called theorems, as the followers of
Speusippus and Amphinomus, believing, that to contemplative sciences,
the appellation of theorems is more proper than that of problems;
especially since they discourse concerning eternal and immutable
objects. For origin does not subsist among things eternal: on which
account, problems cannot have any place in these sciences; since they
enunciate origin, and the production of that which formerly had no
existence, as the construction of an equilateral triangle, or the
description of a square on a given right line, or the position of a
right line at a given point. It is better, therefore (say they), to
assert that all propositions are of the speculative kind; but that we
perceive their origin, not by production, but by knowledge, receiving
things eternal as if they were generated; and on this account we ought
to conceive all those theorematically, but not problematically. But
others, on the contrary, think that all should be called problems;
as those mathematicians who have followed Menæchmus. But that the
office of problems is twofold, sometimes, indeed, to procure the thing
sought; but at other times when they have received the determinate
object of enquiry, to see, either what it is, or of what kind it is,
or what affection it possesses, or what its relation is to another.
And, indeed, the assertions of each are right; for the followers of
Speusippus well perceive. Since the problems of geometry are not of
the same kind, with such as are mechanical. For these are sensibles,
and are endued with origin, and mutation of every kind. And, on the
other hand, those who follow Menæchmus do not dissent from truth: since
the inventions of theorems cannot by any means take place without an
approach into matter; I mean intelligible matter. Reasons, therefore,
proceeding into this, and giving form to its formless nature, are not
undeservedly said to be assimilated to generations. For we say that the
motion of our cogitation, and the production of its inherent reasons,
is the origin of the figures situated in the phantasy, and of the
affections with which they are conversant: for there constructions and
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