The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elementsProclus
Philosophy
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Proclus
Euclid. Elements; Platonists
of quality[154], but not equal and unequal. On this hypothesis,
therefore, angles ought not to be called unequal, and this greater,
but the other less; but they ought to be denominated dissimilars, and
one more an angle, but the other less. But that these appellations
are foreign from the essence of mathematical concerns, is obvious to
every one: for every angle receives the same definition, nor is this
more an angle, but that less. Thirdly, if an angle is inclination, and
belongs to the category of relation, it must follow, that from the
existence of one inclination, there will also be one angle, and not
more than one. For if it is nothing else than the relation of lines
or planes, how is it possible there can be one relation of lines or
planes, but many angles? If, therefore, we conceive a cone cut by a
triangle from the vertex to the base, we shall behold one inclination
of the triangular lines in the semicone to the vertex; but two distinct
angles: one of which is plane, I mean that of the triangle; but the
other subsists in the mixt superficies of the cone, and both are
comprehended by the two triangular lines. The relation, therefore,
of these, do not make the angle. Again, if is necessary to call an
angle either quality or quantity, or relation; for figures, indeed,
are qualities, but their mutual proportions belong to relation. It is
necessary, therefore, that an angle should be reduced under one of
these three genera. Such doubts, then, arising concerning an angle,
and Euclid calling it inclination, but Apollonius the collection of
a superficies, or a solid in one point, under a refracted line or
superficies (for he seems to define every angle universally), we
shall affirm, agreeable to the sentiments of our preceptor Syrianus,
that an angle is of itself none of the aforesaid; but is constituted
from the concurrence of them all. And that, on this account, a doubt
arises among those who regard one category alone. But this is not
peculiar to an angle, but is likewise the property of a triangle. For
this, too, participates of quantity, and is called equal and unequal;
because it has to quantity the proportion of matter. But quality also,
is present with this, in consequence of its figure (since triangles
are called as well similar as equal); but it possesses this from one
category, and that from another. Hence, an angle is perfectly indigent
of quantity, the subject of magnitude. But it is also indigent of
quality, by which it possesses, as it were, its proper form and figure,
Lastly, it is indigent of the relation of lines terminating, or of
superficies comprehending its form. So that an angle consists from
all these, yet is not any one of them in particular. And it is indeed
divisible, and capable of receiving equality and inequality, according
to the quantity which it contains. But it is not compelled to admit
the proportion of magnitudes of the same kind, since it has also a
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