The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elementsProclus
Philosophy
The philosophical and mathematical commentaries of Proclus on the first book of Euclid's elements (Vol. 1 of 2) : $b To which are added, A history of the restoration of Platonic theology, by the latter Platonists: And a translation from the Greek of Proclus's Theological elements
Proclus
Euclid. Elements; Platonists
peculiar quantity, by which angles are also incapable of a comparison
with each other. Nor can one inclination perfect one angle: since the
quantity also, which is placed between the inclined lines, completes
its essence. If then we regard these distinctions, we shall dissolve
all absurdities, and discover that the property of an angle is not the
collection of a superficies or solid, according to Apollonius (since
these also complete its essence,) but that it is nothing else than
a superficies itself, collected into one point, and comprehended by
inclined lines, or by one line inclined to itself: and that a solid
angle is the collection of superficies mutually inclined to each
other. Hence, we shall find that a formed quantum, constituted in a
certain relation, supplies its perfect definition. And thus much we
have thought requisite to assert concerning the substance of angles,
previously contemplating the common essence of every triangle, before
we divide it into species. But since there are three opinions of an
angle, Eudemus the Peripatetic, who composed a book concerning an
angle, affirms that it is quality. For, considering the origin of an
angle, he says that it is nothing else than the fraction of lines:
because, if rectitude is quality, fraction also will be quality. And
hence, since its generation is in quality, an angle will be entirely
quality. But Euclid, and those who call it inclination, place it in the
category of relation. But they call it quantity, who say that it is the
first interval under a point, that is immediately subsisting after a
point. In the number of which is Plutarch, who constrains Apollonius
also into the same opinion. For it is requisite (says he) there should
be some first interval, under the inclination of containing lines
or superficies. But since the interval, which is under a point, is
continuous, it is not possible that a first interval can be assumed;
since every interval is divisible in infinitum. Besides, if we any
how distinguish a first interval, and through it draw a right line, a
triangle is produced, and not one angle. But Carpus Antiochenus says,
that an angle is quantity, and is the distance of its comprehending
lines, or superficies; and that this is distant by one interval, and
yet an angle is not on that account a line: since it is not true that
every thing which is distant by only one interval, is a line. But this
surely is the most absurd of all, that there should be any magnitude
except a line, which is distant only by one interval. And thus much
concerning the nature of an angle. But with respect to the division
of angles, some consist in superficies, but others in solids. And of
those which are in superficies, some are in simple ones, but others in
such as are mixt. For an angle may be produced in a cylindric, conic,
spherical, and plane superficies. But of those which consist in simple
superficies, some are constituted in the spherical; but others in the
plane.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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