Thus, in order to give an account of human morality, Comte adds a rational element to the feeling-elements. Undoubtedly it is not an _a priori_ element. But it is that which for Comte is the substitute of the _a priori_ in metaphysical doctrines: that is the invariableness of the laws of phenomena, which makes the world intelligible. From the speculative point of view this intelligibility, under the name of “the principle of laws,” is the basis of our science. From the practical point of view, the order of the world alone can guarantee the lasting harmony of our inclinations. In this way it becomes the foundation of morality. In spite of the more than evident differences of all kinds which separate Comte from Malebranche and from Leibnitz, it then appears that in his philosophy as in theirs, the idea of _order_ is made use of to pass from the domain of knowledge to that of action. Undoubtedly, with Comte, from theological or metaphysical this idea has become positive. He does not intend to go beyond experience, and affirms nothing which cannot be verified as a fact. But, like the philosophers his predecessors, he is none the less anxious to find the unity of the soul beneath the diversity of its modes of activity, and to show that theoretical reason and practical reason are one and the same. Malebranche solved the problem by appealing to the idea of divine perfection, expressed everywhere by order. Comte explains that the pressure exercised by external order generates order in our mind (which moreover collaborates in it), then, as a consequence, in our feelings and finally in our actions. The stoics had already said something similar on this subject. Briefly, Comte’s ethics may be presented as the positive form of the ethics of universal order.