The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's AesthetikHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 1 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Aesthetics
Upon the question of fact in ordinary scientific inquiry little
difficulty is experienced. Indeed it might on a cursory view even
appear ridiculous if the demand were made that we had to prove in
geometry, for instance, that there were such objects as space, and
geometrical figures, or in astronomy and physics that there was a sun,
stars, and magnetic phenomena. In these sciences, which are concerned
with what is actually presented to sense perception, objects are
accepted from objective experience, and so far from it being regarded
necessary to demonstrate (_beweisen_) them, it is deemed sufficient
to point to (_weisen_) the bare facts. Yet even within the limits of
non-philosophical instruction doubts may arise as to the existence of
certain objects. In psychology, for example, the science of mind, the
doubt is possible whether there _is_ a soul, an intelligence, _i.e._,
something distinct from material conditions, something immaterial[33],
independent and self-substantive, or in the theology whether a God
actually _exists._ Moreover, assuming the objects of the science to be
thus immaterial, in other words, merely present in the mind, and not a
part of the objective world we perceive, we have to face the possible
conviction that there is nothing in the mind, but that which it has
evoked in virtue of its own activity. This brings up incidentally the
question whether men have produced this idea or intuition which is
inward to their minds or not, and even if we do actually accept the
first alternative, whether they have not made such an idea once more
to vanish, or depreciated, the same at any rate to an idea of wholly
_subjective_ validity, whose content possesses no independent or
self-contained existence[34]. In this way, for example, the beautiful
has been frequently regarded as possessing no necessarily essential and
independent stability in the world of our ideas; rather it is accepted
as a pleasure purely personal to ourselves, due to the caprice of our
senses[35]. Even our external intuitions, observations and perceptions
frequently deceive and lead us astray; but still more is this the case
with those ideas that do not arise from sense-perception, even though
they possess in themselves the greatest vitality, and are able to
transport us into passion, we are powerless to resist.
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