The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's AesthetikHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 2 (of 4): Hegel's Aesthetik
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Aesthetics
Quitting now the sphere of thought in which the identity of the
Absolute and its externally envisaged existence is immediately
cognized, we have, as an essential determination to start from, the
severation of these two aspects hitherto united, a _cleavage_ which
stimulates the effort to restore once more the visible breach by means
of an elaborate fusing together of the whole thus divided by a rich
use of the images of phantasy. With this attempt the essential need
for art is felt for the first time. No sooner has the imagination
succeeded in holding fast its envisaged content, which is no longer
grasped in immediate union with the objects of sense, in isolated
separation from that existence, than for the first time spirit is
confronted with the task of reclothing with the material of phantasy
for sensuous perception, that is, under the renewed mode of a spiritual
product, these general conceptions and of creating through this
activity the shapes of art. And for the reason that in the stage of
our process where we now find ourselves, this task is capable of only
a symbolic solution, we may easily fall under the impression that
we stand already in the sphere of genuine symbolism. This, however,
is not the case. What immediately faces us here are the forms of a
fermenting phantasy[41], which in the restlessness of its fantastic
dreams merely indicates the path which conducts us to the real centre
of symbolical art. In the first appearance of the distinguishing
relation between significance and the mode of its presentation, both
the severation and the association are still grasped in a confused
manner. This confusion is necessitated by the fact that neither of
the parted aspects of difference have as yet attained a totality,
capable of emphasizing the precise point in the process, which will
serve as the fundamental determination of the opposed side in it,
and by means of which for the first,time a really adequate union and
reconciliation is rendered possible. Spirit (mind), to illustrate our
difficulty further, determines by virtue of its own totality the
side of the external phenomenon out of its own essential substance
quite as really as it does its own spiritual content for the obvious
reason that the essentially complete and independent phenomenon only
receives its adequate form as the external existence of that which is
spiritual. In the case, however, of this primary severation of the
significances apprehended by mind, and the existent world of phenomena
such aspects of significance are not those of concrete spiritual life,
but abstractions, and this expression also is entirely destitute
of spiritual intension, and is consequently, in an abstract sense,
purely external and sensuous. This twofold impulse in the direction of
disunion and union is for the same reason an unsteady gait[42], which
ranges from the objects of sense in undefined and unmeasured waste
immediately to the aspects of universal import, and is only able to
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