The Philosophy of Giambattista VicoCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico
Croce, Benedetto
Vico, Giambattista, 1668-1744
A change took place, again, in the meaning of the institutions of
property. The civil tenure was no longer a matter of public right,
but was dispersed among the various private tenures of the citizens
now forming the body of the popular state. "Eminent" tenure no longer
signifies the strongest kind of tenure, unencumbered by any actual
charge, even a public charge, but applies simply to an estate free
from any private charge. Quiritary tenure is no longer that of which
the noble was feudal lord and under the obligation to aid his client,
the plebeian, if ousted from it: it has become a private civil tenure,
capable of being defended by a civil suit as opposed to the bonitary
which could be maintained by possession only.
The forms of legal process were pruned of the luxurious growth
of fictions, solemn formulae and symbolic acts, simplified and
rationalised: the intellect, the thought of the legislator was
brought into play and the citizens conformed to an idea of a common
rational utility, understood as spiritual in value. Causes, which were
originally formulae safeguarded by accurate and precise language,
became affairs or negotiations solemnised by agreement and, in the
case of transference of tenure, by natural tradition; and it was only
in contracts said to be completed by word of mouth, that is to say
in stipulations, that the safeguards remained "causes" in the strict
ancient meaning of the word. Thus the certitude of the law, when the
human reason was fully developed, passed into the truth of ideas
determined by the circumstances of fact, a "formula devoid of any
particular form" (_formula naturae,_ as Varro calls it) which, like
a light, informs in all the minutest details of their surface the
details of fact over which it extends. In popular republics the ruling
principle is the _aequum bonum,_ natural equity.
The harsh punishments of the periods of domestic monarchy and heroic
society (the laws of the Twelve Tables condemned those who set fire
to another's crops to be burnt alive, perjurers to be thrown from the
Tarpeian rock, and insolvent debtors to be cut in pieces while living)
were replaced by milder penalties, since the multitude, whose members
are weak, is naturally disposed to clemency.
Laws, which under the aristocracy were few, inflexible and religiously
observed, multiplied under the democracy and became liable to change
and modification. The Spartans, who preserved their aristocracy,
said that at Athens they had many laws and wrote them; at Sparta few,
but they obeyed them. The Roman plebs, like the Athenian, passed new
laws every day, and the attempt by Sulla, the leader of the noble
party, to reduce them by the institution of "_quaestiones perpetuae_"
or permanent courts was in vain, for after his time laws were again
multiplied.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account